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Gant and the Good-Faith Exception
BY KARLY A. KAUF
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.1
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o enforce this guarantee the Supreme Court enacted a rule, known as the exclusionary rule, that
evidence obtained from searches in violation of the
Fourth Amendment would be suppressed at trial.2
Nearly one-hundred years later, the rule has become riddled
with exceptions and qualifications, allowing for the admission
of evidence despite constitutional violations in the manner in
which it was obtained.3 Specifically, the good-faith exception
permits admission when a police officer reasonably relied on
some qualified basis in taking action, such as the approval of a
neutral magistrate.4
The Supreme Court’s decision
in Arizona v. Gant changed the scope
of the interpretation of its prior ruling
in New York v. Belton.5 In Belton, the
Court explained that after a police officer has lawfully arrested the occupant of an automobile, a search of the
passenger compartment contemporaneous to arrest is valid for the purpose of ensuring the officers’ safety
and the preservation of evidence.6
Subsequent to this holding, police
departments enacted procedures instructing officers to search the passenger compartment every time an
occupant was arrested.7 The Court in
Gant reasoned that the Belton rule’s
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dual aims of ensuring officer safety and preserving evidence
were ill served by such an interpretation.8 In modifying this rule,
the Gant Court held that a search violates the Fourth Amendment if a defendant is already in police custody when the warrantless search of an automobile occurs.
Following this decision, federal circuit courts disagreed
over Belton’s application to defendants searched in the manner
proscribed by Gant.9 Some courts suppressed evidence of the
search pursuant to exclusionary and retroactivity principles.10
Others admitted the evidence by applying the good-faith exception to searches conducted based on a police officer’s reliance on judicial precedent.11 This Article argues that should
the Supreme Court have the occasion to reconcile these interpretations, it should follow the direction of the former circuits
by holding the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable where police officers rely solely on judicial precedent, thus excluding evidence obtained during that search.
Part II of this Article outlines the foundation of the exclusionary rule and the good-faith exception.12 A detailed discussion of Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent is included
to demonstrate the contradiction in the Circuits’ applications
of these principles.13 Part III conducts an analysis of Circuit
Court cases to identify the interpretation that best adheres to
constitutional safeguards. Adoption
of the Ninth Circuit and D.C. Court
of Appeals’ interpretations is preferable because it provides support for
exclusion of evidence while adhering
to constitutional and other considerations in certain circumstances.14 In
conclusion, this Article advocates
for the Supreme Court to ensure the
equal treatment of similarly situated
defendants throughout the country by
declaring the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule inapplicable.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule is a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally,” and
not meant to serve as a remedy for an individual defendant.15
This rule requires evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution to be suppressed from admission in subsequent judicial
proceedings.16 Initially, the rule sent the strong message that
failure to comply with search and seizure requirements would
have consequences.17 However, over the past century the Supreme Court has carved out numerous exceptions and qualifications to the exclusionary rule, which have slowly whittled away
its scope to the point that elimination of the rule altogether is a
genuine possibility.18
In determining whether to suppress evidence, the Court developed a balancing test, which weighs the costs and benefits of
exclusion.19 The Court explained that such costs include exclusion of “inherently trustworthy” evidence, in addition to their
concern that “[i]ndiscriminate application of the exclusionary
rule . . . [will] ‘generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice’.”20 Originally, the two benefits of exclusion were
articulated as protecting the integrity of the court system and
deterring future unconstitutional conduct. In current progeny,
the deterrence rationale has more or less enveloped the integrity reasoning.21 In finding the deterrent effect, “the Court will
consider both specific deterrence of individual law enforcement
officers involved in Fourth Amendment violations and systemic
deterrence of the law enforcement profession generally.”22 The
suppression of evidence is a drastic action, and is only applicable to provide substantial deterrence for future constitutional
violations, thus justifying this significant cost to society.23
Though the list of articulated exceptions and qualifications
is lengthy, a defendant’s case must always meet three criteria:
1) there must be a sufficient nexus between the violation and
the evidence sought to be admitted; 2) the defendant must be a
person permitted to challenge the illegality of the search; and 3)
the constitutional violation must be serious enough to warrant
suppression.
First, exclusion requires a significant connection between
the constitutional violation and the evidence sought to be presented. Pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
suppression is required unless “granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come . . . by means sufficiently distinguishable
to be purged of the primary taint.”24 Additionally, evidence otherwise discoverable is not subject to the exclusionary rule unless the violation is asserted by an independent source.25
Next, the standing requirement provides that in order to
challenge evidence admission due to an improper search, a de24

fendant must demonstrate a violation of his or her legitimate
expectation of privacy.26 Additionally, one must demonstrate
that his or her case was properly decided pursuant to a particular precedent; specifically, binding decisions of a higher court
rendered while a defendant’s matter is under direct review are
entitled to the benefit of the exclusionary rule.27
Finally, the Court must determine if the violation is of the
type that warrants suppression. The Court has determined that
certain “minor” defects or mistakes do not invoke the exclusionary rule. In reaching that determination, the reviewing court
must consider whether the good-faith exception would apply
and allow the evidence to be admitted despite the existence of
a constitutional violation.28 Thus, as long as no “serious” violation of the Fourth Amendment is present, the exclusionary rule
will not apply and the evidence will be admitted.29

B. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION
Pursuant to the good-faith exception elicited in United
States v. Leon, all evidence seized during the execution of a
search warrant is admissible even if the warrant is subsequently
determined to be invalid, as long as the officer’s reliance on that
warrant was in good faith.30 “Good faith” is determined using an
objective standard, i.e., whether the police officer should have
known the search was unreasonable.31 The Court’s analysis in
each case has relied upon this “illusion of technical precision
and ineluctability” in order to rationalize further expansion of
the good-faith exception.32
It is important to note that the seminal holding underlying
the good-faith exception in Leon included a scathing dissent
from Justice Brennan, in which he argued that the Court exaggerated the costs of exclusion while underestimating its benefits.33 Justice Brennan explained:
[I]t is clear that we have not been treated to an honest assessment of the merits of the exclusionary rule, but have instead
been drawn into a curious world where the “costs” of excluding illegally obtained evidence loom to exaggerated heights and
where the “benefits” of such exclusion are made to disappear
with a mere wave of the hand.34
Notwithstanding the dissent, the Court has expanded the
exception’s scope to include reliance on other administrative
errors. For example, no suppression is allowed when the warrant executed was based on erroneous information from the
court clerk.35 Similarly, evidence is admissible when executing
a warrant from another jurisdiction where the information is
later found to be incorrect because of that jurisdiction’s error.36
Evidence is also admissible when the search was based in an
existing statute later found to be unconstitutional.37 These applications of the exception are based on the notion that the officer’s
reliance on such information was objectively reasonable, and no
deterrent effect would be advanced by excluding the evidence.38
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C. PRECEDENT
1. Supreme Court of the United States
a. Arizona v. Gant
In 1999, Tucson police officers arrested Rodney Gant outside of his home after they discovered that he had an outstanding arrest warrant for driving with a suspended license, and then
witnessed him driving.39 After arresting Gant, the officer handcuffed him and placed him in the locked backseat of a patrol
car.40 Two officers then searched Gant’s car, finding both a gun
and a bag of cocaine.41 Gant was charged with possession of a
narcotic drug for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia.42
During his court proceedings, Gant moved to suppress the evidence discovered in his vehicle because the warrantless search
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.43 Gant argued that because he was secured in the backseat of the patrol car, he posed
no threat to the officers’ safety.44
Further, he argued that no evidence
of the traffic violation could be
discovered in the vehicle.45 When
asked at the suppression hearing
why the search was conducted, the
arresting officer simply stated, “Because the law says we can do it.”46
Although the trial court rejected the State’s argument of probable cause to search Gant’s vehicle,
which would have triggered the automobile exception, it nevertheless
denied Gant’s motion to suppress
the evidence because the search was
incident to his arrest.47 The State’s
highest court reversed this decision by holding that, although precedent allowed the contemporaneous
search of an automobile following
the lawful arrest of its occupant, it did not answer “the threshold
question whether the police may conduct this search once the
scene is secure.”48
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court adopted the
State’s reasoning based on Chimel v. California, which justifies a search and grants exception to the warrant requirement
when protection of officer safety and preservation of evidence
is at stake.49 The Court explained that once the scene is secure,
Chimel’s dual aims are no longer present, and thus a warrantless
search is not allowable.50 As such, the Supreme Court affirmed
the holding of the Arizona Supreme Court and excluded the
evidence obtained.51 Specifically, the Court held:

Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle
will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or
show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.52
In so holding, the Court reasserted the rationale underlying
Belton, explaining that police departments’ interpretations of
that holding have been incorrect since its inception. 53 Thus,
the Court explained, procedures allowing the unfettered search
of a vehicle’s passenger compartment incident to a lawful arrest, with no regard to the Chimel justifications, are unconstitutional.54
The Court invoked Justice
Brennan’s dissent in Belton, where
he “characterized the Court’s holding as resting on the ‘fiction . . . that
the interior of a car is always within
the immediate control of an arrestee
who has recently been in the car.’”55
The Court explained that erroneous
obedience to unconstitutional police
procedures over an extended period
of time does not invoke stare decisis nor entitle perpetuation of the
unconstitutional action in order to
ease the duties of police.56 The result of the Court’s holding was to
disallow the use of a common and
widely accepted police procedure,
and police officers around the country had to follow new procedural
rule that comported with the holding.57 Specifically, an officer could
only conduct a search incident to arrest when the search protects
the officer’s safety or preserves evidence.58
Before Gant was decided, the Court encountered cases applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in a
variety of situations. Discussion of those decisions is helpful
in understanding the underpinnings of the instant question and
allows for a more complete analysis of the constitutional issue.

Evidence is admissible

when executing a warrant
from another jurisdiction
where the information
is later found to be

incorrect because of that
jurisdiction’s error.
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b. Herring v. United States
In 2004, Bennie Herring drove to the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department to get something out of his impounded truck.59
A sheriff’s investigator, who had had numerous encounters
with Herring in the past, asked the warrant clerk to check the
computer database to determine if Herring had any outstanding
25

warrants for arrest in Coffee County.60 When none were found,
the investigator asked the clerk to contact her counterpart in
another county to inquire about outstanding warrants for arrest
in that jurisdiction.61 The clerk discovered an active arrest warrant for failing to appear on a felony charge, and the investigator followed Herring out of the impound lot, pulled him over,
and arrested him.62 The investigator performed a search of Herring’s vehicle and discovered both drugs and an illegal firearm.63 However, unbeknownst to the investigator, the warrant
had been recalled five months earlier and the computer database
had not been updated.64 While the warrant clerk tried to alert
the investigator of the error within ten to fifteen minutes of the
discovery, Herring had already been arrested and found to be in
possession of the drugs and gun.65
Herring was indicted for the illegal possession of drugs
and a firearm in violation of federal law.66 Herring moved to
suppress the evidence found in his car because the initial arrest warrant had been rescinded.67 The district court adopted the
recommendation of the magistrate, who reasoned that the arresting officer’s good-faith reliance that the warrant was valid allowed the evidence to be admitted.68 The Magistrate explained,
“[E]ven if there were a Fourth Amendment violation, there was
‘no reason to believe that application of the exclusionary rule
here would deter the occurrence of any future mistakes.’”69 The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s holding.
In reviewing the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the good-faith exception allows the admission of evidence obtained through police error.70 The Court analogized the facts to those of Leon,
Krull, and Evans and determined that the good-faith exception
applied, reasoning that application of the exclusionary rule is
not an individual right and should be utilized only when it provides a substantial deterrent effect.71 Previous precedent seemed
to apply the good-faith exception only in situations where the
police themselves did not cause the unconstitutional search.72
However, without reference to the fault of the police department
in causing the violation, the Court explained that the deterrent
effect must be weighed against the cost of exclusion.73 In order
for the exclusionary rule to apply, “police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and
sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid
by the justice system.”74 Because the police officer relied on a
warrant he presumed to be valid, there was no need to deter
future conduct, even though the arrest was based on the police
department’s own erroneous information.75 Pursuant to this reasoning, the Court held that the evidence was admissible under
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.76

c. Danforth v. Minnesota
In 1996, Stephen Danforth was found guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor.77 During his trial,
the judge ruled that the six-year-old victim was incompetent
to be a witness at trial.78 Notwithstanding that finding, the jury
was allowed to view a videotaped interview of the victim, as
the testimony bore “sufficient indicia of reliability” to allow
for its admittance without violating the Confrontation Clause.79
Among other factors, the victim’s testimony “appeared spontaneous and largely unsolicited by leading questions” and the
victim seemingly “lacked any apparent motivation to fabricate
the accusation.”80
Danforth appealed his conviction based largely on his
assertion that admission of the videotape violated his Sixth
Amendment rights.81 However, pursuant to applicable precedent, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction
because the videotape was “sufficiently reliable to be admitted
into evidence.”82 Danforth’s conviction became final after the
Minnesota Supreme Court denied review, and Danforth’s time
for filing a writ of certiorari lapsed in 1998.83
Nearly six years later, in Crawford v. Washington, the
Supreme Court of the United States held, “Where testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient
to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”84 Crawford established a rule
contrary to that of Danforth, and thus overturned the applied
precedent.85 As a result, Danforth moved for post-conviction
relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because the admission of the videotape violated the new rule.86 The Minnesota
Supreme Court denied relief, explaining that federal retroactivity precedent did not permit review of Danforth’s case.87
The Supreme Court of the United States granted Danforth’s
petition for certiorari to determine the constitutional question.88
In reversing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, the Court
held that although federal precedent did not allow for retroactive application of Crawford, such a decision does not forbid
Minnesota from applying it retroactively to state cases.89 The
Court explained:
Retroactivity suggests that when we declare that a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure is “nonretroactive,” we are implying that the right at issue was
not in existence prior to the date the “new rule” was
announced. But this is incorrect. As we have already
explained, the source of a “new rule” is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules
of law. Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily
pre-exists our articulation of the new rule.90
Thus, the Court elucidated the principle that the retroactivity
doctrine does not apply to the constitutional decision itself. In-
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stead, the question is whether a violation of that already-existing
right prior to the change in the law entitles a person to relief.91
d. Illinois v. Krull
Albert Krull and his business partners [hereinafter Krull]
operated an automobile wrecking yard in Chicago in 1981.92 At
that time, an Illinois statute required licensed sellers of motor
vehicles and their parts to allow state officials to inspect certain
records.93 Pursuant to this statute, a Chicago Police Department
detective entered Krull’s wrecking yard and asked to inspect
the record books.94 The detective also received permission to
inspect the cars in the yard; upon doing so, he discovered that at
least three of the cars had been stolen.95 Krull was charged with
various criminal violations relating to the incident.96
One day after the search of Krull’s wrecking yard, the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
that a warrantless administrative search of licensees was unconstitutional.97 Relying on that ruling, the state trial court
granted Krull’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered at
the wrecking yard.98 The Appellate Court of Illinois vacated the
trial court’s finding and remanded for consideration in light of
applicable law indicating that a “good-faith reliance on the state
statute might be relevant in assessing the admissibility of evidence.”99 Nevertheless, the trial court maintained its decision
on remand, explaining that the statute in effect at the time was
unconstitutional and thus the evidence could not be admitted.100
The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the decision of the trial
court, rejecting the State’s argument that the evidence should
be admitted based on the officer’s good-faith reliance on the
statute.101
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the decision, holding that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was applicable.102 They explained that Leon’s holding
meant the good-faith exception applied and the evidence was
admissible if it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the statute comported with the Fourth Amendment.103
Conversely, as in Leon, if the statute was objectively unreasonable, then any evidence obtained through such a search must be
excluded.104
In reaching their decision, the Court expounded three reasons why the exclusionary rule should not apply.105 First, application of the exclusionary rule would not deter police from
violating the Constitution where a statute explicitly authorizes
their behavior.106 The Supreme Court stated, “Unless a statute is
clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be expected to question the judgment of the legislature that passed the law.”107 Next,
application of the exclusionary rule was not necessary to deter
legislatures from violating the Constitution, as there was no evidence to support the belief that legislatures are prone to such
behavior. In addition, utilization of the exclusionary rule would
have little, if any, effect on the legislature, as the punishment
Criminal Law Brief

for enacting such a statute would be the courts striking it down,
not applying it to a particular case.108 Last, the Court explained
that application of the good-faith exception would not insulate
statutes from judicial review because not only could defendants
still challenge searches by arguing that the statute was clearly
unconstitutional, they could also bring declaratory-judgment
actions to enjoin the enforcement of the law.109 Based on this
reasoning, the Court applied the good-faith exception to situations in which “officers act in objectively reasonable reliance
upon a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches,
but where the statute is ultimately found to violate the Fourth
Amendment.”110

2. Courts of Appeals
a. Denying Application of the Good-Faith Exception to
Changing Judicial Precedent
i. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
In 1998, Charles Acker’s home was the subject of an investigation into suspected marijuana cultivation and sales.111
During the course of the investigation, the Wisconsin Division
of Narcotics Enforcement performed a thermal imaging scan of
Acker’s house without first obtaining a search warrant.112 Utilizing the scans, along with other evidence, law enforcement
obtained a warrant to search the property, during which they
discovered and seized a large amount of plants, cultivated marijuana, and growing supplies.113
In late 1998, the government filed a civil forfeiture action
pursuant to a federal statute.114 In that action, Acker filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his home, arguing that the thermal image scans were a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.115 The district court denied Acker’s motion,
and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
denial.116 However, in 2001, the Supreme Court of the United
States granted Acker’s petition for certiorari and vacated the
decision of the Seventh Circuit. The Court remanded the decision for further consideration in light of Kyllo v. United States,
in which the Supreme Court held that warrantless “thermalimaging observations of the intimate details of a home are impermissible.”117 The Seventh Circuit nevertheless upheld the
search, reasoning that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule was applicable in a situation where an agent reasonably
relied upon a validly issued search warrant, even if the reasons
for that validity were later found to be unconstitutional.118 In
doing so, the Seventh Circuit Court explained that the officer’s
reliance on the warrant was distinguishable from an officer’s
reliance on court precedent itself.119 The Seventh Circuit stated:
We decline to extend further the applicability of the
good-faith exception to evidence seized during law enforcement searches conducted in naked reliance upon
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subsequently overruled case law—as distinguished
from the subsequently invalidated statute at issue in
Krull—absent magistrate approval by way of a search
warrant. Such expansion of the good-faith exception
would have undesirable, unintended consequences,
principal among them being an implicit invitation to
officers in the field to engage in the tasks—better left
to the judiciary and members of the bar more generally—of legal research and analysis.120
Thus, in making its decision, the Seventh Circuit Court was
careful to explain that searches conducted in reliance on judicial precedent, with nothing more, are not bound by Krull and
instead should be excluded from application of the good-faith
exception.121
ii. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Ricardo Gonzalez was convicted of possession of a firearm
in violation of a federal statute after the car he was riding in
was pulled over for a routine traffic stop.122 The driver of the
vehicle had outstanding warrants, leading the police to search
the passenger compartment of the vehicle incident to his arrest, during which they discovered a loaded Beretta in the glove
box.123 Gonzalez moved for suppression of the evidence, asserting
that the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights; however, the
motion was denied based on the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
established precedent of Belton.124
Following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gant, Gonzalez sought
to have the search invalidated using
the newly elucidated rule.125 The
government conceded that under the
current interpretation, “[t]he search
of Gonzalez’s vehicle was improper
because Gonzalez was handcuffed
and secured in a patrol vehicle at the
time of the search of the vehicle.”126
Still, the government argued that the
search was conducted in good-faith
reliance on Belton, and thus the exclusionary rule should not apply.127
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the government’s contention and suppressed the search.128 It explained
that the government’s reliance on Herring was erroneous because it did not apply to the instant case, but instead to cases in
which the officers relied on a warrant later deemed invalid or
where a statute or regulation was found to be unconstitutional
during direct review of the defendant’s conviction.129

The Ninth Circuit Court explained that the “retroactivity”
line of precedent should control Gonzalez’s motion.130 It reasoned that United States v. Johnson required application of the
exclusionary rule in this case, as failure to do so would “violate
the integrity of judicial review” by turning the judiciary into a
legislative body that announces new rules rather than interprets
the Constitution.131 Additionally, such a decision would “‘violate the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the
same’ by allowing only one defendant to be the beneficiary of a
newly announced rule.”132
iii. District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Police initiated a traffic stop of Lorenzo Ali Debruhl in
early 2009 after he was observed driving without his headlights
on at night.133 After running a check of his license plate and
discovering that his car was unregistered, police asked Debruhl
to exit the car, handcuffed him, placed him under arrest, and had
him stand behind his vehicle with an officer.134 Upon doing so,
another officer searched the passenger compartment of the car
and discovered a brown paper bag containing controlled substances and contraband.135
Debruhl was indicted for possession with intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia.136 Debruhl filed
a motion to suppress the drugs and
paraphernalia pursuant to the recent
Gant decision.137 The trial court
noted that the search was incident to
Debruhl’s lawful arrest, making the
only issue for consideration whether
the recent Gant decision required
suppression of this evidence in light
of the fact that the search took place
prior to that decision.138 After discussion of Gant and relevant case
law, the trial court ruled that the
good-faith exception did not apply
and suppressed the evidence found
in Debruhl’s car.139
The District of Columbia Court
of Appeals upheld the suppression of
the evidence.140 First, the Court explained that no dispute existed as to
whether Gant applies retroactively;
the search of Debruhl’s car and subsequent seizure of evidence
were unconstitutional.141 Instead, the legal question regarded
the retroactive applicability of the exclusionary rule pursuant
to a Fourth Amendment violation.142 At trial, Debruhl argued
that the exclusionary rule is inherent in the Fourth Amendment
and therefore must accompany retroactive application here. In
opposition to this motion, the government argued that the exclusionary rule is no longer considered to be an “essential part”

such a decision would
“‘violate the principle
of treating similarly

situated defendants the
same’ by allowing only

one defendant to be the
beneficiary of a newly
announced rule.”
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of the Fourth Amendment, and “thus retroactive applicability of
the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily imply retroactive
application of the exclusionary rule, without exception; these issues are separate.”143 The Court agreed with the government that
the exclusionary rule is not necessarily tied to the retroactivity
of a Fourth Amendment ruling, but explained:

for the good-faith exception to apply. Otherwise, that
officer, conducting a search later held unlawful by the
Supreme Court, would be in no better position than
that of the officer in a typical mistake-of-law situation
that arguably makes a reasonable, but ultimately incorrect, guess at the lawfulness of the search.153

Gant presents a closer question, as language from both
the Court’s opinion and the principal dissent suggest
that both sides assumed suppression would follow
from retroactive application of the Court’s decision.
That said, none of the opinions in Gant expressly acknowledged, let alone addressed, that assumption. We
are therefore left to deal with the issue anew in connection with the good-faith exception.144

The Court explained that although there are settled principles
within the good-faith progeny, such as reliance on a defective
warrant, a state statute, or an erroneous police record, judicial
precedent does not categorically qualify for the good-faith exception.154 Specifically, the Court held that Belton and its progeny does not reflect settled law with reference to the facts of the
instant case, and thus application of the good-faith exception
was unavailable.155

Second, the Court of Appeals discussed the good-faith exception with reference to a “mistake-of-law” situation.145 The
Court reasoned that although the Supreme Court’s holding in
Herring rejected the notion that the exclusionary rule is an inherent Fourth Amendment right, that explanation was premised
in the context of an officer’s “reliance on a warrant, a statute, or
other official record germane to an anticipated search.”146 The
narrow issue presented, the Court explained, was whether “a police officer’s reliance on appellate opinions supply the check on
police behavior—and thus serve as the basis for objective good
faith—that statutes, warrants, and other official records provide
in advance of a search.”147 In its analysis, the Court of Appeals
clarified that the only situation being considered was when the
Supreme Court modified a “settled rule of law on which the officer relied” prior to its ruling.148 The Court explained that the
good-faith exception is unavailable in a “mistake-of-law” situation in which an officer’s illegal actions can be excused by a
good-faith, yet erroneous, understanding of the law, and the situation in this case should not be conflated with that scenario.149
Third, the Court of Appeals discussed the applicability of
the good-faith exception to “settled law.”150 The Court explained
that if Belton and its progeny reflected “settled law,” then the
good-faith exception likely applied.151 However, if the officers
relied on a precedent that did not reflect “settled law,” the goodfaith exception could not be applied. 152 As the Court reasoned:
[T]here is a crucial predicate that must be satisfied before the warrantless search of an automobile under Belton law can be a candidate for the good-faith exception.
The tribunal’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s
rule on which the officer relies must be “settled” as
applied to all the material facts the officer faces. Short
of satisfying that strict requirement—i.e., a requirement of explicit protection or “cover” from the court
on which the officer relies—we cannot say that the officer’s search would be objectively reasonable enough
Criminal Law Brief

b. Applying the Good-Faith Exception to Changing
Judicial Precedent
i. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Charles Jackson and Anthony Browning [hereinafter Jackson] were convicted of possession of controlled substances with
intent to distribute after their car was searched at a checkpoint
near the Mexican border.156 Jackson sought to suppress the evidence discovered in the vehicle based on, among other reasons,
his assertion that the exclusionary rule should be applied to
searches now deemed illegal by a change in circuit precedent.157
In rejecting Jackson’s argument and upholding the search,
the Fifth Circuit Court explained that excluding such evidence
would not meet the goal of deterring unconstitutional conduct
and thus was untenable.158 Analogizing to Leon, the Court explained that just as “there was no sound reason for extending the
exclusionary rule to deter misconduct on the part of judicial officers responsible for issuing warrants,” no such reason existed
here, as there was no implication that the Court was “‘inclined
to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment.’”159 It noted that
the reasoning in Leon was applicable to this case because officers’ reliance on precedent was reasonable, as the Court had
upheld searches at the same checkpoint numerous times before
they were deemed unconstitutional.160 Using that reasoning, the
Fifth Circuit Court held the evidence obtained from the search
to be admissible.161
ii. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
Markice McCane was stopped for a suspected traffic offense in 2007.162 Upon realizing that McCane’s license was
suspended, the officer arrested McCane, handcuffed him, and
placed him in the backseat of his patrol car.163 The officer then
searched the passenger compartment of McCane’s car and
found a firearm in the pocket of the driver’s side door.164 McCane was charged with possessing a firearm in violation of federal statute.165 McCane filed a motion with the District Court
to exclude the firearm from submission as evidence, which the
29

Court denied based on its conclusion that the search was performed incident to a lawful arrest.166 McCane appealed his conviction after the jury returned a guilty verdict.167
While McCane’s case was pending before the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Gant.
In light of that decision, McCane argued that his case should
be governed by the newly applicable standard, and thus the
evidence should be excluded.168 In opposition, the government
asserted that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
should be applied to the officer’s reliance on past precedent and
thus the evidence should be allowed.169
The Court of Appeals agreed with the government’s argument, determining that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Krull
and Herring was relevant here because in each situation, a police officer reasonably relied on information he believed to be
correct.170 The Court explained, “The Supreme Court’s line of
good-faith cases clearly indicates that the reach of the exclusionary rule does not extend beyond police conduct to punish
the mistakes of others, be they judicial officers or employees, or
even legislators.” 171 Thus, the Tenth Circuit Court determined
that no genuine deterrent effect would be served by excluding
evidence in this situation.172 In doing so, the Court found that
the foremost consideration in determining whether to invoke the
exclusionary rule is deterrence of misconduct by law enforcement officers.173
The Court concluded that, similar to the situations in Evans
and Krull, no officer misconduct exists where an officer relies
on settled precedent, even when the search is later found to be
invalid.174 As such, the Court denied McCane’s motion and
upheld his conviction.175 Subsequently, McCane petitioned the
Supreme Court for certiorari and was denied.176
iii. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Also in 2007, Willie Davis was arrested after a routine traffic stop; when asked his name he answered “Ernest Harris.”177
Prior to exiting the vehicle, Davis removed his jacket and placed
it on the driver’s seat, even though the officer requested otherwise.178 The officer took Davis to the rear of his vehicle, where
a group of bystanders had gathered.179 The officer obtained Davis’s real name from one of the bystanders, arrested Davis for
giving a false name, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back
of the patrol car.180 During a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, the officer found a revolver in the pocket
of the jacket that Davis had removed.181
Davis was indicted for possession of a firearm in violation
of federal statute.182 At that hearing, Davis filed a motion to
suppress the evidence found in his jacket pocket, which was
denied because the court found that the search was incident to
a lawful arrest.183 Davis appealed his conviction following the
Gant decision.184
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In reviewing Davis’s case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule applied to this case and upheld the conviction. The Court
determined that the holding in Gant must be applied to this case
pursuant to applicable retroactivity precedent because the case
was pending on direct appeal when Gant was decided.185 Still,
the Court of Appeals explained that although the search violated
Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights, whether to exclude the evidence obtained through that violation was a separate question.186
As such, the Court held that the good-faith exception allowed
for inclusion of the evidence, as the rationale served by the exclusionary rule did not apply.187
In so holding, the Circuit Court explicitly disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Gonzalez.188 The Ninth Circuit
Court had reasoned that the Supreme Court’s application of the
exclusionary rule to the defendant in Gant, rather than announcing the rule and then applying the good-faith exception to the
police’s conduct, required the same treatment in Gonzalez pursuant to established precedent.189 The Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, refuted this assertion, explaining that the
holding in Gant was confined to the question of the constitutionality of the search, and did not endorse the manner in which
Arizona applied the exclusionary rule.190
Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit Court disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that failure to suppress evidence
in this type of case would result in a violation of the integrity of
judicial review.191 The Eleventh Circuit Court explained that it
“considers constitutional violations and remedies separately in
the Fourth Amendment context and the Supreme Court has refused to tie the retroactivity of the new Fourth Amendment rules
to the suppression of evidence.”192 Reiterating the language
of the Tenth Circuit in McCane, the Court explained, “The
issue . . . is not whether the Court’s ruling in Gant applies to this
case, it is instead a question of the proper remedy upon application of Gant to this case.”193
Pursuant to that reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule
was applicable in this case.194 The Court explained that it could
not decipher any consequential difference between this situation and those of Leon and Krull.195 As such, the Court denied
Davis’s motion for suppression and upheld his conviction.196

III. ANALYSIS
Since Gant, the Circuit Courts have demonstrated profound
disagreement over the application of the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule when a police search, lawful at the time
of its occurrence, is made unlawful due to changing judicial
precedent.197 As such, it is necessary for the Supreme Court of
the United States to resolve the circuit split and allow for uniFall 2010

form adjudication of cases pending in the judicial pipeline so
“similarly situated defendants” are treated equally throughout
the country.198
In doing so, the Supreme Court should conclude that the
reasoning of the D.C. Court of Appeals, with support from the
Ninth Circuit, faithfully applies the appropriate precedent.199 Indeed, the Supreme Court should declare the good-faith exception inapplicable to searches made in reliance on subsequently
changed law, and exclude evidence seized in violation of the
Constitution.

A. POST-GANT DECISIONS COMPARED
Even prior to Gant, the Circuit Courts discussed the
broader issue of the good-faith exception’s applicability to
changing law.200 However, because the effect of Gant has been
to require revision of commonly accepted police practices in
virtually every jurisdiction, the issue has been pushed to the
forefront.201 In a short time, Gant’s holding has created confusion and discord throughout the country; four circuits have
reached differing conclusions about
the applicability of the good-faith
exception and all have based their
decision on different rationales.202
As previously discussed, the
D.C. Court of Appeals held that
evidence obtained in reliance on
precedent later deemed unconstitutional does not qualify for the
good-faith exception and therefore
must be excluded.203 The Court reasoned that no dispute existed as to
whether Gant applies retroactively,
not only because the Government
conceded this point, but also because the retroactivity precedent
clearly supported this notion.204
However, while no contest existed
as to whether the defendant’s rights
were violated, the issue turned on
whether the violation necessarily required exclusion of the evidence obtained through the illegality.205 The
Court explained that the question of
Gant’s retroactive application with
reference to the Fourth Amendment violation was separate from
the question of retroactive application of the exclusionary rule
pursuant to that violation.206 Thus, retroactivity could not be the
sole reason for invoking the exclusionary rule, and the question
of admissibility required further inquiry into the “rule of law”
upon which the officer relied.207

In the District of Columbia Courts, the determining factor
was whether the “rule of law” was “settled” enough to allow the
officer’s good-faith reliance to override the presumption of the
necessity of a warrant to protect the defendant’s constitutional
rights.208 The Court discussed other areas within the good-faith
context they deemed to be “settled,” and concluded that the law
with regard to good-faith reliance on judicial precedent did not
meet the required threshold.209 Therefore, it is necessary to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Gant requirements
because the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule is
inapplicable.210
Although the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion, its
decision does not provide the next level of retroactivity analysis discussed by the D.C. Court of Appeals.211 The entirety of
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was based upon its understanding
that retroactivity of precedent requires that evidence obtained
in contravention of Gant’s requirements be excluded for all
“similarly situated defendants.”212 However, there is a gap in
this Circuit’s reasoning because it fails to explain whether retroactivity requires both the constitutional violation and the remedy of
exclusion be applied to defendants
on direct review.213
Still, the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit provides further support to
the more comprehensive decision
of the D.C. Court of Appeals. The
Ninth Circuit explained that failure
to apply Gant retroactively (presumably both the constitutional violation and the exclusion of evidence)
effectively turns the judiciary into a
rule-making legislative body, rather
than a separate branch of government charged with interpreting the
Constitution.214 Invoking the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Danforth, the Ninth Circuit explained
that the Supreme Court’s announcement should not be understood to
create a new right that did not exist
prior to its holding, but was instead
simply a declaration of rights that
one already had.215
In contrast to the differing analyses in the Ninth Circuit
and the D.C. Court of Appeals, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits based their decisions on similar grounds. The Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits interpreted the fundamental purpose of the
exclusionary rule as the desire to deter future unlawful police
conduct.216 The Tenth Circuit ruled the good-faith exception
applies because the exclusionary rule may only be invoked in
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situations where future police misconduct would be deterred by
suppression.217 Such an extension of this principle was unwarranted because deterrence of unconstitutional behavior by the
judiciary, the legislators, or other government entities has never
been deemed a valid reason for excluding evidence.218
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that reliance on settled precedent does not invoke the need to deter future police conduct, so
the good-faith exception was applicable.219 Similar to the D.C.
Court of Appeals, it explained that while retroactivity precedent
requires that Gant be applied to cases pending on direct appeal,
a Fourth Amendment violation and exclusion of evidence pursuant to that violation are distinct issues that should be addressed
separately.220 Contrary to the D.C. Court’s holding, however,
it held that the good-faith exception allows the evidence to be
included because the rationale behind the exclusionary rule did
not apply.221 In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly referenced the Ninth Circuit’s holding, refuting its assertion that
inclusion of evidence in this type of situation would violate the
integrity of judicial review because the Ninth Circuit’s holding
was restricted to remedies available to the defendant and not the
retroactive applicability of the constitutional interpretation.222
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings are unsound
when compared to the holdings of the Ninth Circuit and the
D.C. Court of Appeals.223 The Eleventh Circuit based its entire
holding on the assertion that reliance on settled precedent does
not invoke the exclusionary rule, yet its decision is completely
devoid of any analysis of what qualifies as “settled law.”224 Instead, both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits perpetuate the circular argument that the good-faith exception applies because
there is no need to deter future unconstitutional conduct by the
police, and that there is no need to deter future unconstitutional
conduct by the police because the good-faith exception applies
to judicial precedent.225
The Supreme Court of the United States should adopt the
reasoning set forth in the holdings of the Ninth Circuit and the
D.C. Court of Appeals.226 That reasoning, particularly when
combined, logically applies the applicable precedent while remaining faithful to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
In addition to the overarching protection of constitutional rights,
further considerations support such a decision.

B. RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF EXCLUSION
1. Constitutional Considerations
Every Court to decide the issue so far has agreed that the
constitutional requirements elicited in Gant must be retroactively applied; meaning that in each case, the Court conceded
that there was a constitutional violation of the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights.227 Yet, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits contend that such an application does not require exclu-
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sion, so that evidence is only excluded when the deterrence of
future police misconduct is necessary.228
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ rationale dodges the
genuine constitutional issues in lieu of applying quasi-related
situations to the case on review in order to squeeze it into an
established good-faith exception.229 Although a cursory glance
at Krull or Herring may seem analogous to the cases on review,
a deeper consideration is required to determine if they are in
fact similar.230
The Supreme Court routinely holds that the good-faith
exception is proper when police erred in relying on a defective warrant or unconstitutional statute.231 Police do not have
complete discretion over when to conduct a particular search.
Instead, they must follow the explicit directions of a neutral
party, namely a magistrate, clerk, legislator, or other. In contrast, applying the good-faith exception here, where there was
no explicit rule allowing for the warrantless search, would permit police to rely on their own (or the department’s) interpretation of judicial holding. The Gant situation provides a perfect
example of the dangers of allowing the good-faith exception to
apply in such a situation.232 In that case, police departments had
been erroneously interpreting the Belton holding for decades
through their internal procedures. Law enforcement should not
be rewarded for their own error through the inclusion of illegally obtained evidence at trial. The Herring decision bolsters
this assertion, as even though evidence obtained after execution
of a defective warrant due to a database error was found to be
admissible, there was still a check on the unfettered discretion
of the officer because he had to obtain a warrant (although erroneous) before searching.233
As explained in Danforth, the Supreme Court does not create new constitutional rules; it simply applies the established
protections of the Constitution. In doing so, there are times
when the Court must explain that the Constitution has been erroneously followed due to a certain decision or interpretation
of that decision. However, an individual’s rights were there all
along, and the Court is merely clarifying the manner in which
they must be protected.234

2. Other Considerations
There are other important reasons for clarifying the scope
of the good-faith exception. First, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is most often advanced by parties to a particular action
appealing the decision of the trial court and moving through the
appellate procedure.235 If the Supreme Court were to follow the
Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, thus announcing that good-faith
exceptions permit the admission of evidence found via unconstitutional police conduct, little incentive to appeal one’s conviction would remain.236 In order to maintain consistency, the
Court would be forced to determine that the officer in the instant
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case also reasonably relied on judicial precedent, and thus no
relief would be available.237
That notion brings up the issue of judicial intent in Gant.
If courts could legitimately apply the good-faith exception
when an officer relies solely on judicial precedent, Mr. Gant
would not have been able to get his evidence suppressed. Instead, consistent with the established process, Gant’s evidence
was suppressed because his Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated.238 A contrary conclusion cannot be reconciled with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, as he was allowed to
benefit from the clarification of the Belton rule.239 The internal
inconsistency in such an argument is overwhelming, and cannot
possibly provide the necessary foundation for a rule that would
have such a drastic effect on constitutional rights.

IV. CONCLUSION
The exclusionary rule began as a strong pronouncement
that an individual’s constitutional rights are of utmost importance, and as such, genuine enforcement mechanisms must be
enacted to ensure that these rights are protected. While exceptions and qualifications have caused the rule to lose its strength
over its near century-long existence, the exclusionary rule is
necessary to maintain the genuine protections guaranteed by the
Fourth Amendment. Conversely, the good-faith exception was
created as a very narrow exception and has expanded dramatically to include various forms of police officers’ good-faith reliance. However, it is important for the Court to remember that
the good-faith exception is just that: an exception. It should not
be molded and distorted to encompass every situation in which
a particular officer was not at fault. Instead, it should be applied
sparingly in order to ensure that police officers conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
The efficacy of the Fourth Amendment depends on adherence to its requirements and declaration of rules to enforce
those requirements. The Supreme Court of the United States,
in reviewing lower courts’ decisions, adheres to both precedent
and logical construction to ensure the faithful application of the
Constitution. In doing so, it should find the good-faith exception
to the exclusionary rule inapplicable when a police officer relies
solely on judicial precedent to support a warrantless search, so
that evidence improperly obtained is suppressed.
CLB
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